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ABSTRACT Recently, the study of road surface condition monitoring has drawn great attention to improve
the traffic efficiency and road safety. As a matter of fact, this activity plays a critical role in the management
of the transportation infrastructure. Trustworthiness and individual privacy affect the practical deployment
of the vehicular crowdsensing network. Mobile sensing as well as the contemporary applications are made
use of problem solving. The fog computing paradigm is introduced to meet specific requirements, including
the mobility support, low latency, and location awareness. The fog-based vehicular crowdsensing network is
an emerging transportation management infrastructure. Moreover, the fog computing is effective to reduce
the latency and improve the quality of service. Most of the existing authentication protocols cannot help the
drivers to judge a message when the authentication on the message is anonymous. In this paper, a fog-based
privacy-preserving scheme is proposed to enhance the security of the vehicular crowdsensing network. Our
scheme is secure with the security properties, including non-deniability, mutual authentication, integrity,
forward privacy, and strong anonymity. We further analyze the designed scheme, which can not only
guarantee the security requirements but also achieve higher efficiency with regards to computation and
communication compared with the existing schemes.
INDEX TERMS Fog computing, crowdsensing vehicular networks, privacy-preserving, strong anonymity,
non-deniability.

I. INTRODUCTION

The road surface condition is considered as a major indicator of road quality. As we know, winter weather always
brings along with snow, ice, and freezing rain, all of which
when acting alongside poor road surface conditions create
situations that are potentially dangerous to people, vehicles,
and property. As a result, this is an area where systems
for monitoring road conditions are critical to improve road
safety [1]. The vehicular crowdsensing network has drawn
great attentions during recent years and can provide a safe
and comfortable driving experience [1]–[4]. Combining the
vehicular communication with the sensing technologies is
an advanced vehicular technology. It is promising to detect
and deal with the road surface condition using this advanced
system [1]. Everyone with mobile devices, including smartphones, smartwatches with embedding sensors can gather the
43776

environment information or other users’ information around
us [1], [2]. This property makes it one of the most important
innovations. Particularly, the applications and architectures
for both crowdsensing and vehicle-based sensing alongside
advanced in cloud computing can do data collection, analysis,
processing, transmission and storage efficiently [5], [6].
The could-based architecture is applied in many scenarios/applications for instance smart city [7] and vehicle ad hoc
networks(VANETs). Figure 1. shows that the cloud-based
architecture consists of smart devices, roadside units(RSUs),
and cloud servers. Mobile sensors are embedded in smart
devices’ and RSUs can link to cloud servers. We use the
mobile sensors to collect data while there are anomalies on
the road. Then the data are transferred to the cloud server for
processing. The cloud-based system is centralized [8]. The
smart devices and vehicles are deployed in the networking
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FIGURE 1. Cloud-based architecture.

that can probably lead to crowdsensing. The RSUs play as a
role of base station for transferring data to cloud to provide
recommendations for processing [9]. The end users are free
from the limitation of computation and communication and
the storage resources are based on using cloud computing.
However, it is too hard for the cloud computing architecture
to support user mobility, low latency, and location awareness
[8], [10]. The real-time data processing is needed for the
approaching cars to offer instant road surface suggestions.
When dealing with the crowdsensing data, cloud-based solutions cause several issues such as relaying real-time data to
centralized cloud servers which results in increasing bandwidth costs and time delays [11], [12].
The fog computing as well as edge computing [12] can
extend the cloud computing and related services to the
network edge. The interesting features, including position
awareness, low latency, increased mobility [13], and real-time
applications processing, provided by fog-based architecture
are shown in Figure 2. We can distinguish the fog from the
cloud by the dense geographical distribution, its distance to

the end users, and its support for mobility [12]. For the fog
computing, the data are transmitted to the closed RSU once
detected by the sensor, which is different from the cloudbased centralized computing. Then the RSUs will implement
the real-time processing and make local decisions [14].
As a matter of fact, vehicular crowdsensing networks allow
vehicles to communicate with each other, or vehicles to
RSUs, via the sensors equipped in the vehicles. By this kind
of communication between the vehicles and RSUs, a lot
of attractive comfort services such as weather information
and broadcast emergency traffic warning on the road can be
provided [15], [16]. Moreover, the security and privacy issues
should be addressed before the implementation of the vehicular crowdsensing networks. Otherwise, many problems arise,
e.g. the drivers cannot estimate the traffic situation via the
received message unless the message has been authenticated.
However, if the underlying authentication protocols reveal
the real identity of the vehicle, then the location privacy of
the vehicle cannot be protected [17]. The security model is
shown in Figure 3. We should guarantee the authenticity and
integrity of the messages translated in the network. Moreover,
users’ identity and location should be protected [18], [19].
The fog device itself is vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle
attack [20].

FIGURE 3. Our System Model.

A. RELATED WORK

FIGURE 2. Fog-based architecture.
VOLUME 6, 2018

Much efforts have been directed toward VANETs [2], [3],
[6], [11], [21], [22]. There are several mechanisms during
the past years. For instance, the silent period [21], creating
mix-zones [22], were used to preserve driver privacy. The
vehicle mobility can be predicted due to the characteristics
of the vehicular network. Furthermore, event the identity of
the vehicle was changed, the location of the vehicle can be
linked to pseudo identities and then the real identity of the
vehicle could be discovered. For the mix-zones, when the
approaching vehicles pass the intersection where there is a
RSU deployed, the vehicles coordinate with each other and
their pseudo identities are changed at the same time.
• Road Surface Condition Detection We consider the
scenario that mobile sensors are used in detecting the
43777
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•

road surface conditions. With the multiple powerful
sensors embedded in, modern devices including GPS
systems, accelerometers have made sensing capabilities
possible. Mobile sensors are used to detect and report
in multiple scenarios. Eriksson et al. [23] proposed a
mobile sensing app named pothole patrol(P2) to detect
and report the road surface condition. Mohan et al. [24]
also proposed a new approach to improve the P2 system by using wireless sensor networks with the helping of smartphones hardware platform for sensing the
surface condition of the road. The proposed protocol
uses linkage a data collection system with a database
server to store the data. Most of these applications
use cloud-based architecture. However, we propose a
privacy-preserving protocol for vehicular crowdsensing
networks using fog computing.
Fog Network Architecture The fog-based network
architecture is a new paradigm that can provide computation, communication, configuration, storage, control, and manage the crucial features, including low
response latency, location awareness and geographic
distribution [9], [12] between the Internet and terminal
devices. The fog nodes located at the edge of the fog
networking can communicate with the huge number of
self-organized decentralized mobile devices. Moreover,
the mobile nodes can collaborate with each other via the
fog nodes. There are several fundamental managements
include in the fog networking. For example, essential
amount of storage is carried out at or nearby the end
user rather than storing in the large scale data center.
Fog nodes perform a large amount of communication
at or near the end-user instead of through the backbone
network [25]. Since fundamental managements were
carried out, the fog node in the networking should act
as a router for its neighbors and adapt to the mobility
of the node. Crowdsensing vehicle network is an instantiation of VANET. Therefore, the principles used in
VANETs could be the basis for the fog-based crowdsensing vehicle networks [26]. In fog networking, the data
collected by the sensor are sent to the network edge
devices, routers for processing instead of sending to the
cloud servers. Therefore, the fog computing network
with a low bandwidth is effective to reduce the traffic data. Moreover, the fog computing minimizes the
latency and improves the quality of service. The fog
computing reduces the traffic data to the cloud and not
delay the computation and communication due to the fog
nodes are placed near to data source. The new fog-based
computing paradigm supports heterogeneity including
access points, edge routers, and enduser devices. It can
provide advantages in advertising, entertainment, personal mobile computing, and other applications [27].
Luan et al. [28] introduced a distributed fog computing
system where the fog servers were deployed in distributed manner by separate owners work.

43778

The RSU who shares the same secret key with the vehicle
can create any fake proofs. Public key based protocols can
achieve the non-deniability property when digital signature
based vehicle authentication mechanism is used. The above
reasons and research gap motivated us to develop a new
privacy-preserving fog-based protocol that can be used in the
vehicular crowdsensing network. Contributions of our work
are mainly in the following accepts.
• Mutual authentication. Our protocol allows the vehicle
and the RSU to mutually recognize and authenticate
each other, and is secure against various types of manin-the-middle and interleaving attacks.
• Strong user anonymity. Our protocol can also achieve
a strong user anonymity (or unlinkability) property,
which ensures that not only the vehicle identity is wellprotected, but also a vehicle is unlinkable among different sessions. We utilize the designated verifier signature
and the hash chain techniques to achieve this goal.
• Forward privacy. Forward privacy ensures that the previous transmitted information cannot be traced if a vehicle
is compromised at a later time. Our protocol uses a novel
secret updating mechanism to ensure that forward privacy of the vehicle is achieved for different time epoches
(or periods).
• De-synchronization resilience. The updating of the
secret information between the RSU and the vehicle may
cause the de-synchronization attack to happen. In our
protocol, we use a hash chain and the ‘‘accept then
update’’ mechanism on the RSU side to make sure the
RSU and the vehicle are synchronized.
• Non-deniability. One of the contributions of this work
is to realize the non-deniability property. The vehicle
cannot deny its active involvement in the protocol when
there exists a dispute. Also, the RSU was allowed to
prove to any third party that the vehicle has indeed
participated in an authentication protocol.
Paper Outline: Our paper is organized as follows. We introduce the fog-based vehicular crowdsensing network and
review the related work in Section I. Then we give the system
model and attack model, which is followed by the security
requirements in Section II. We present our new fog-based
vehicular crowdsensing protocol in Section III and analyze
its security in Section IV. We compare the performance of
our protocol with the previous public key based protocols in
Section V, and conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODELS AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

We describe our system model, attack model and the security
requirements in this section.
A. SYSTEM MODEL

The road surface condition monitoring system comprise of
mobile sensors, e.g., smart devices and vehicles, RSUs as
fog devices, a service center(SC) and cloud services. The
architecture was shown in Figure 3.
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1) Mobile sensors embedded in the smart devices and
vehicles generate the signals, time, location and road
events i.e., accidents.
2) RSU is an edge device which have storage capacity
can extend the cloud service to achieve efficient computational. The RSUs can affect the end users nearby
make decisions. The RSUs can do immediate processing when they received a real-time data captured by the
mobile sensors.
3) A trusted entity called SC was used to initialize and
manage the whole system. Note that SC is a key generation center which cannot access the RSUs and sensors
sensitive data. We assume the computation and storage
capabilities of the SC is sufficient.
4) The center of the system is cloud servers, all of the
system data are stored in the cloud then to be utilized
later. We use the fog-based device instead of sending all
the data generated by the sensors to the cloud, which
can avoid the high latency and high bandwidth cost.
The computation was processed by the RSUs. Then
the computation results were send to the cloud and the
connected devices or vehicles.

rity requirements: mutual authentication, strong anonymity,
availability, forward privacy and non-deniability.
•

•

•

B. ATTACK MODEL

In our system, for simplicity, we assume that there is a security channel between the cloud and RSUs. That is, we will
treat the RSU and the cloud as a single entity. The RSU and
the vehicle are connected via an insecure wireless channel.
The information transmitted between the vehicle and the RSU
is publicly accessible. We also assume that the decisions
made by the vehicle or the RSU is public and known to anybody including the adversary. We only focus our attention to
guarantee the security of the data generate from vehicles and
then send to RSUs. Our system model is shown in Figure 3.
The message lack of message oriented privacy may result
in adversaries release the message and then the receiver may
obtain the false message that have been tampered by the
adversary. The data can be changed by the malicious adversary for their own benefits. The adversary can control and
monitor the whole communication and data transmit through.
Particularly, the adversary can change or even replace the
message. Furthermore, the attacker can also capture a number of mobile sensors and RSUs. All the data pass through
can be analyzed and intercepted by the attacks. Moreover,
the RSUs may become attackers and forward the forged
messages to the vehicles to make them react in a certain way.
The vehicle or smart device could also become malicious
which generate false message for his own purpose.
C. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

In this section, we define the security requirements which
are the criteria to evaluate the security of a fog-based vehicular crowdsensing network/VANET protocol. As mentioned
above, vehicular crowdsensing network is an instantiation of
VANET. We are particularly interested in the following secuVOLUME 6, 2018

•

•

R1: mutual authentication: Mutual authentication means
the RSU can successfully authenticate the vehicle, and
vice versa. vehicle authentication is a basic security
requirement for a fog-based vehicle system since the
RSU needs to ensure the vehicle it has queried is the
real one. RSU authentication is also important in some
circumstances, e.g., when the RSU wants to update some
information in the vehicle. The vehicle must ensure that
the information is from the real RSU.
R2: strong anonymity: As mentioned in the introduction, privacy is an important security requirement for
VANETs. The mobile sensors’ identities should be hidden during the authentication to protect the sender’s
private information. Generally, we can separate privacy
into weak anonymity and strong anonymity. The former
means hiding the identity of the entity, while the latter
is also known as untraceability or unlinkability, which
means an attacker cannot link multiple communication
sessions that involve the same vehicle.
R3: availability: Availability means a VANET system is
secure against the Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. For
VANET systems, we are particularly interested in the
security against the de-synchronization attacks between
the RSU and the vehicle.
R4: forward privacy: It is also important that the current compromised vehicle information cannot be used
to trace the vehicle’s previous transmitted information.
In this paper, we will focus on forward privacy between
different time epoches, which means compromising a
vehicle (i.e., obtaining the vehicle’s internal state) duing
a time epoch does not affect the vehicle’s privacy in the
previous time epoches.
R5: non-deniability: We should allow the RSU to prove
to any third party that the vehicle has indeed participated
in an authentication protocol. In particular, the vehicle
cannot deny its active involvement in the protocol when
a dispute arises.

III. OUR PROPOSED SCHEME

In this section, we present our new fog based VANETs protocol which achieves all the security properties given above.
In Table 1 we present the notations that are used in our
protocol, which is illustrated in Figure 4.
•

Setup: Let P denote the generator of a cyclic group
of order q. The private and public key pairs of the
vehicle and the RSU are (x, X = xP) and (y, Y =
yP), respectively, where x, y ∈ Z∗q . In our protocol,
we use IDi to denote the identity of the vehicle. Let
h(·) and H (·) be cryptographic hash functions. In addition, let Ki denote a symmetric key shared between
the RSU and the vehicle i, and t the maximum number of sessions between the RSU and the vehicle in
each time epoch. The server maintains a hash chain
43779

J. Wei et al.: Privacy-Preserving Fog Computing Framework for Vehicular Crowdsensing Networks

FIGURE 4. Our mutual authentication fog based VANETs protocol with non-deniability.
TABLE 1. Notations used in the protocol.

•

•

{H m (Ki ), H m+1 (Ki ), . . . , H m+t (Ki )} for vehicle i and
time epoch bm/tc where m = 0 at the setup (i.e.,
H 0 (Ki ) = Ki and H i+1 (Ki ) = H (H i (Ki ))). Also, we use
K to denote the symmetric key which will be updated
by the vehicle in each session, i.e., at the beginning we
have K = Ki .
43780

Offline Phase. At the setup or the end of an epoch,
the vehicle randomly chooses ri ∈ Z∗q , and sets Ri = ri P,
Q = ri Y . This can be performed by the vehicle when it
is offline (i.e., not being queried by the RSU). The value
of Ri will also be included in the record Mi at the server
side once vehicle i has been successfully identified by
the RSU (see below for the details).
Identification Phase.
1) RSU Challenge: The RSU randomly chooses a
challenge C ∈ {0, 1}k (k is the security parameter,
e.g., 80-bit, 128-bit, 160-bit, etc.) and sends it to
the vehicle.
2) Vehicle Response: After receiving C from the
RSU, the vehicle first computes v = h(R, Q, K , C)
and s = xv + r (mod q). The vehicle then sends
the pair (T = K ⊕ R, s) to the RSU and updates
K = H (K ).
3) Vehicle Authentication: Upon receiving the vehicle’s response, the RSU authenticates the vehicle’s
identity as follows.
a) For each record Mi in the database, search if
Ri ⊕ T ∈ Mi (i.e., Ri ⊕ T is in the hash chain).
VOLUME 6, 2018
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If such a record is found, then compute v0 =
h(Ri , yRi , Ri ⊕ T , C) and check whether sP =
v0 Xi + Ri . If the verification is successful,
the vehicle IDi is successfully identified. The
RSU checks if the hash chain for the current
epoch is used up. If so, update the record Mi
to the next epoch and set b = 1. Otherwise,
set b = 0. Compute Z = h(Ri , yRi , C, H (Ri ⊕
T ), b) and send (Z , b) to the vehicle.
b) Otherwise, if no Ri ⊕T if found in the database,
for i = 1 to n and j = 1 to t, compute R0 =
H m+j (Ki ) ⊕ T , v0 = h(R0 , yR0 , H m+j (Ki ), C),
and check whether sP = v0 Xi + R0 . If so,
the authentication for vehicle IDi is successful.
The RSU updates Ri ← R0 , and checks if the
hash chain for the current epoch is used up.
If so, update the record Mi to the next epoch
and set b = 1. Otherwise, set b = 0. Compute
Z = h(R, yR, C, H (R0 ⊕T ), b) and sends (Z , b)
to the vehicle. If no vehicle is identified during
the whole loop, the RSU rejects the vehicle.
4) RSU Authentication: The RSU should also
authenticate itself to the vehicle. After receiv?
ing (Z , b), the vehicle checks whether h(Z ) =
h(R, Q, C, K , b).
– If the equation is true, meaning that the RSU
is also successfully authenticated, the vehicle
accepts the RSU. If b = 1, meaning that the
hash chain in the RSU side has been updated to
the next epoch, the vehicle performs the Offline
Phase to choose a new r 0 ∈ Z∗q and compute
R = r 0 P, Q = r 0 Y .
– Otherwise, the authentication of the RSU is
failed, and the vehicle does not perform any
action.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS

In this section, we will analyze the security of the proposed
fog-based vehicle protocol in terms of the security requirements defined in Section III.
A. R1: MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION BETWEEN
VEHICLE AND RSU

For the mutual authentication, our protocol can achieve both
vehicle authentication and RSU authentication.
1) VEHICLE AUTHENTICATION

Our protocol uses the Schnorr signature [29] for vehicle
authentication. In our protocol, the RSU sends a fresh challenge C to the vehicle in each session, and the vehicle sends
back a response which contains an anonymized Schnorr signature (T , s). After receiving the response, the RSU checks
whether a valid Schnorr signature (Ri , s) can be recovered
from the response. If the vehicle has been authenticated successfully before for the same time epoch, then the RSU has
VOLUME 6, 2018

already had the value of Ri , and it can locate this value by a
search over database. Otherwise, the RSU has to go through
the hash chain for each vehicle to locate a value R0 such that
(R0 , s) form a valid siganture. Since the Schnorr signature is
existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks [30],
no one is able to forge a valid signature without knowing
the private signing key. Also, since the RSU uses a fresh
nonce C as a challenge in each session, the attack cannot
replay a signature, which has been used by the vehicle before,
in a new session. Therefore, combining the unforgeability of
the Schnorr signature and the challenge-response mechanism,
vehicle authentication can be achieved.
2) RSU AUTHENTICATION

In the case of authenticating the RSU, after receiving (Z , b)
from the RSU, the vehicle computes h(R, Q, C, H (K ), b) and
checks whether it equals to Z . If the RSU is the real one,
i.e., it knows the RSU’s private key y, then it can compute
yR = rY = Q. Otherwise, due to the difficulty of the DiffieHellman problem, an attacker is not able to calculate the value
of Q. Also, since the value K is updated by the vehicle in each
session, it serves as a nonce to prevent the replay attacks.
B. R2: STRONG ANONYMITY OF THE VEHICLE

Our protocol can guarantee strong anonymity of the vehicle,
which implies vehicle anonymity and untraceability. During
the execution of the anonymous authentication protocol in the
Identification Phase, vehicle the response T is never repeated
in different sessions although the same R is used during a time
epoch (i.e., t sessions). This is achieved by masking R using
a symmetric key K shared between the RSU and the vehicle.
Since K is only known by the RSU and the vehicle and is
updated in each session using the hash chain, the value of T is
independent in different sessions if we treat the hash function
as a random function. Also, due to the uniqueness of K and C
in each session, the values of v and s are also diffferent
between different sessions. Therefore, only the RSU who is a
designated verifier can recover and verify the signature, while
from the advresary’s view point, T and s are just fresh random
values in each session.
C. R3: AVAILABILITY

As we have mentioned before, many VANETs authentication
schemes which update the secret information between the
RSU and the vehicle are subject to the de-synchronization
(or DoS) attack. In our protocol, we need to guarantee the
synchronization of R and K between the RSU and the vehicle.
The value of R is changed for each session during a time
epoch. Therefore, once a vehicle is recognized and authenticated by the RSU, the value of R will be stored by the
RSU, and for the rest of the time epoch, the value of R
remains unchanged and hence is always synchronized. When
the vehicle updates the value of R at the end of an epoch,
it becomes de-synchronized with the RSU. Nevertheless,
the RSU will discover the unsynchronization during the next
43781

J. Wei et al.: Privacy-Preserving Fog Computing Framework for Vehicular Crowdsensing Networks

identification session, and update the value of R once the
vehicle is authenticated.
The value of K is updated by the vehicle in each session,
no matter the session is successfully completed or not. However, since the RSU keeps a long hash chain, as long as K is
within the hash chain, the vehicle and the RSU remain synchronized. Also, during the identification process, when the
RSU detects that the entire hash chain has been used up, it will
update the hash chain for the next time epoch. We should note
that the RSU will update the hash chain only when the vehicle
has successfully passed the authentication, which means the
vehicle has updated K to the first element of the next hash
chain.

D. R4: FORWARD PRIVACY

Forward privacy means that even if a vehicle is compromised,
its privacy in the previous authentication sessions is still
well preserved. Our proposed protocol can achieve forward
privacy for all the authentication sessions belonging to the
previous time epochs when a vehicle is compromised.
When a vehicle is compromised during a time epoch,
the adversary is able to obtain all the current state information
of the vehicle which includes (x, Y , X , K , r, R = rP, Q =
rY ). Since the vehicle updates the value of K in each session using a hash-chain, due to the one-wayness of the hash
function, from K = H i (K ), the adversary cannot derive the
previous keys H j (K ) for j = 0, 1, · · · , i − 1. Also, since
the values of (r, R, Q) are updated at the end of a time epoch,
the adversary is not able to obtain such values for the previous
time epoches. Therefore, the adversary is not able to trace
the authentication sessions of the vehicle in the previous time
epochs.
However, we should note that our proposed protocol cannot ensure the forward privacy of a vehicle within one
time epoch. Given the state information (x, Y , X , K , r, R =
rP, Q = rY ) of a vehicle, since the value of R is changed
0
during a time epoch, the adversary can compute K = T 0 ⊕ R
0
for some T appeared in a previous authentication session s.
0
If K = H ` (K ) for some integer `, then the adversary knows
that the vehicle is invloved in the session s.

the RSU does not need to disclose its private key y in order to
prove the involvement of a vehicle in a particular session.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

In this section we analyze the performance of our protocol
and compare it with some public key based protocols. Since
we can assume the service server connected to the RSU is a
powerful device, we will mainly focus on the performance of
the vehicle.
A. COMPUTATION AND COMMUNICATION COST

In terms of the computation cost, the vehicle needs to perform
2t exponentiation (i.e., scalar multiplication if implemented
using ECC) operations for each time epoch (i.e., t sessions).
For each online session, the vehicle needs to do 3 hash operations. Therefore, for each time epoch, the vehicle needs to do
a total of 2t exponentiation operations and 3t hash operations.
For the communication cost, our protocol requires 3 rounds
for mutual authentication in each session. The total length of
the messages exchanged between the RSU and the vehicle
is (k + 3 ∗ |P| + 1) bits. Here we assume that both of the
hash functions have a output length of |P| (i.e., the length of
a group element). For ECC, we have |P| = 2k, so the total
length of the exchanged messages is 7k + 1 bits.
B. COMPARISON

We compare the security and the performance of our protocol
with some existing public key based protocols in Table 3 and
Table 4, respectively. From the tables, we can see that our
protocol provides strong security but incurs less computation
overhead. In particular, our protocol requires less linear number of exponentiation operations in each time epoch.

TABLE 2. Operation running time.

TABLE 3. Security comparison among public key based protocols.

E. R5: NON-DENIABILITY

Non-deniability ensures that a vehicle cannot deny that it has
involved in an authentication session. Such a property cannot
be achieved using symmtric key techniques. Our protocol can
achieve this property due to the use of the Schnorr signature
for vehicle authentication. Since the Schnorr signature is
existentially unforgeable [30], no one except the vehicle is
able to create a valid signature. In order to prove that a vehicle
is involved in an identification session, the RSU can release
R, Q, K that occurred in a successfully authenticated session
with the communication transcript (C, T , s) to a third party
who can check the validity of the signature via the equations
sP = h(R, Q, K , C)X +R and T = K ⊕R. We should note that
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TABLE 4. Performance comparison among public key based protocols.
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TABLE 5. Tag computation time (t = 10).

FIGURE 5. Tag computation time (t = 10).

According to the running time results in [31] and [32], one
hash function evaluation requires about 0.065ms, while one
exponentiation (i.e., scalar multiplication) operation requires
roughly 1.6s. Based on these data, in Table 5 and Figure 5
we compare the accumulated running time of the tag for T
sessions where T = 10, 20, . . . , 50. We assume that each
time epoch has 10 sessions (i.e., t = 10).
VI. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we first reviewed the limitations of the existing
cloud based networking. Then we constructed a privacypreserving protocol for the vehicular crowdsensing network
using fog computing. The protocol can achieve all the
necessary security requirements including mutual authentication, strong anonymity, availability, forward privacy and
non-deniability. The security and performance analysis shows
that our protocol achieves strong security. The comparisons of
computation and communication cost show that our scheme
can achieve better efficiency.
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